SPECIAL REPORT

Mine migrancy in Zimbabwe and South Africa

by Suzanne Dansereau

The New South Africa is currently wrestling with a mining system in which the bulk of the workforce is migrant, illiterate and classified as unskilled, earning low wages. The search is now on to overcome this legacy and develop a mining policy in keeping with a democratic South Africa.

From the Zimbabwean experience this paper derives lessons for South Africa. It demonstrates not only the complexity of dismantling the migrant labour system but also the persistence of many of its characteristics long after formal abandonment of a migrant labour policy, if the more fundamental structures of the industry's labour utilisation model, such as the continued reliance on cheap, unskilled labour, are not modified.

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The New South Africa is currently wrestling with a mining system in which 48 per cent of the workforce is still migrant, 62 per cent are illiterate and the bulk classified as unskilled, earning low wages. The search is now on to overcome this legacy and develop a mining policy in keeping with a democratic South Africa. The ANC, aware of the industry's pivotal economic role and especially its status as one of the largest employers in the country, is nonetheless concerned with the denial of basic workers rights inherent in migrant labour and the difficult living conditions of the single-sex hostels.[1] Employers are also concerned with this legacy as they search for 'innovative, flexible and competent employees able to contribute to ongoing improvements in both efficiency and safety at the workplace'.[2]

While there is a general emphasis on training in most policy circles, policy options around the migrant labour system tend to be voiced as distinct from issues of skills, education and training, and mining's role in development. The exception here is the National Union of Mineworkers who warn that summarily dismantling the current migrant labour system could 'cause untold suffering to the point of starvation in the under-developed areas'. It advocates instead phasing it out by introducing policies aimed at increasing wages, providing access to family housing, education and higher skill levels.[3] This concern stems from a recognition that many members continue to rely on the migrant system and in fact are interested in maintaining, if not all of it, then some parts of it.

This paper will argue that while the issue of migrancy is central to ending the cheap migrant labour system, in the case of Zimbabwe where formal migrancy was abandoned years ago, 15 years after independence, the mining industry is still based on labour intensive production, with the bulk of workers classified as semi- or unskilled, earning low wages, and relying heavily on a new form of migrancy. This is demonstrated by a 1993 industry survey conducted at the Institute of Mining Research of the University of Zimbabwe and by studies showing the emergence of a 'working life' or circulatory migration.[4]

The paper thus derives some timely lessons for South Africa as it demonstrates not only the complexity of dismantling the migrant labour system but also the persistence of many of its characteristics long after formal abandonment of a migrant labour policy, if the more fundamental structures of the industry's labour utilisation model, such as the continued reliance on cheap, unskilled labour, are not modified. Migrant labour is in fact part of a cohesive labour utilisation model and its transformation requires not only legislating an end to the labour contract and the use of recruiters, but must also include policies that address issues of low wages, low nominal skill levels, temporary housing and mining community development. These must be included within a policy framework that looks at the broader questions of the industry's structure and especially the role it plays in the country's social and economic development.

The migrant labour system - *chibaro*

The classic model of Zimbabwe's cheap migrant labour system emerged out of the peculiar context in which mining developed during the early colonial years in the late 19th century. The industry grew in the periphery, not only of the world economy but also as a poor cousin to the larger South African mines on the Rand. Its dispersed mineral deposits could not compete with the Rand for capital or labour, and the industry became integrated into a regional economic system, dominated by South Africa, that would eventually include the Zambian copper mines and turn Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho into labour reserves.[5] Southern Rhodesian mining managed to continue nonetheless, exploiting the country's gold and coal deposits by low levels of capital investment and by emphasising cost minimisation, thus requiring cheap labour.

The integration into a Southern African system and the necessity of developing a cheap labour market resulted in the adoption of social and labour policies similar to South Africa, including the alienation of land, the institution of reserves, hut taxes, pass laws and others.[6] Yet when these proved insufficient to assure an adequate supply of labour at the very low wages paid by the Rhodesian mines, *chibaro*, a system of forced contract labour was instituted. Begun in 1903, recruiters brought workers from outlying areas and territories on short term contracts, often under duress, in return for food to sustain travel to mine sites or settler farms. Marked by brutality and high levels of control of the workforce, the system successfully increased the supply of labour to the mine and reduced mining's overall wage bill.[7] It also served to reinforce the overall process of proletarianisation and underpinned the emergence of the cheap migrant labour system.

Accompanying *chibaro* were a series of other colonial legislation including the alienation of land and the creation of the reserves. Excessive low wages and the inability to bring families to the work site compelled miners to retain their dependence on the reserve and transferred the reproduction cost of labour to these rural subsistence areas, thus providing an additional subsidy to the mining industry and settler production.[8] This was reinforced by the Land Apportionment Act (1930) that led to a further deterioration of African agriculture, forcing many more into wage labour. In addition, migrant workers were relegated to unskilled tasks within the labour intensive industry and this became entrenched with the passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1934, as African workers were excluded from the status of 'employee', effectively barring them from the labour legislation system and especially from access to apprenticeship programmes.

The *chibaro* period is usually associated with the operations of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau from 1903-33, yet while mine labour was not exclusively obtained by contract, problems with labour supply persisted because of the higher wages paid in the South African mines and aggravated after the opening of the Zambian copper mines in 1926. The onset of World War II and the rapid growth and diversification of the economy intensified the problems. Labour was thus conscripted during World War II and while the objective was nominally to provide labour to the settler food-producing farms in the name of the British war effort, mining companies were able to divert workers to the mines. Labour recruiters continued to be used until the early 1970s by the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission.[9]

Stabilisation during colonialism

Zimbabwe's move away from the migrant labour system and attempts to stabilise the labour force after World War II and during the Federation and UDI periods, did not succeed in transforming the labour utilisation model. Instead attempts at reforming the system are marked by conflicts between the principal economic sectors, an unconvincing commitment to stabilisation even by its advocates, and the mining industry's capacity to ignore pressures to reform. The result was a failure to bring about any significant change to the bulk of miners working and living conditions prior to independence, in spite of the elimination of the most coercive elements of the migrant labour model. Changes that did occur in mining labour resulted not from stabilisation policies but from changes in production that led to increasing skill and wage differentiation.

High international demand for raw materials resulted in an influx of foreign capital into Southern Rhodesia during and after World War II resulting in a large scale economic restructuring, the emergence of new sectors and a diversification away from its reliance on mining export and settler agriculture. The settler base was swamped and ownership became concentrated into fewer hands as the same companies invested in the three important sectors: mining, agriculture and manufacturing.[10]

Economic diversification meant that mining lost its central role in the economy as it's share of the GDP fell from 26 per cent in 1943 to 6 per cent in 1972.[11] Yet there was a massive growth and diversification of the mining sector itself as large-scale investment not only increased the size of gold mining operations but led to the opening of base metal mining, especially in asbestos and chrome, with an expansion in coal. Total value of output doubled between 1942 and 1954[12], and between 1964 and 1979 the unit value tripled again while the volume increased by 85 per cent.[13] Operations were now run by some of the largest mining companies in the world, controlling the production and marketing of minerals on a world scale, some of which could influence international prices and make production decisions with only minimal reference to host countries.[14] The most prominent were Anglo-American Corp, Lonrho, Rio Tinto and others. This concentration increased with UDI after 1965 as sanctions created difficulties in repatriating profits, requiring that companies re-invest locally. Some of this investment took the form of downstream development as companies sought to increase value and decrease weight and volume. Mining companies also invested in other sectors, thus increasing the control of multinationals over the economy as a whole.[15]

The scale of operations led to a reduction in the number of gold smallworkers from 1 750 in 1935 to 300 in 1956[16] who continued to mine less profitable and sometimes sporadic deposits. They became marginalised politically, first in relation to the Chamber of Mines which developed a two-tiered voting system based on the size of companies, effectively giving power to larger companies,[17] and then in relation to the State.

The growth of a local and regional market during the Federation period (1953-62) led to the emergence of a strong manufacturing sector, the second largest on the continent, behind South Africa.[18] Manufacturing had begun originally by state-led import-substitution during World War II, but after the war, foreign capital established branch plants to make use of the preferential relationship with South Africa. Manufacturing grew significantly throughout the post-war period, from 34.6 MZWD in 1946 to 112.9 MZWD in 1955, and again during UDI from 18 per cent of GDP in 1965 to 24 per cent in 1979. Like the other sectors, control shifted out of settler hands.[19]

Agriculture was also transformed. Agribusiness plantations and their adjacent processing plants, organized into limited liability corporations replaced the medium-scale mixed farm. Only settlers able to operate large scale commercial farms maintained their presence in the sector. The value of output grew 10 times between 1937 and 1958, mostly due to tobacco, which during the 1940s, became a major export commodity and foreign currency earner.[20]

The emergence of these new economic sectors led to a conflict over the labour utilisation model. Manufacturing, pushed by its need for a local market, advocated the stabilisation of labour by pushing for reforms that would allow families to live near the workplace. This stable workforce could now be trained, resulting in higher productivity, higher wages and the emergence of a domestic market. By contrast labour intensive tobacco production, marketed externally, prompted the agricultural sector to push for a continuation of cheap unskilled labour.[21]

The mining sector was situated in between these two poles. Dominated by foreign capital and serving a foreign market almost exclusively, it still relied on labour intensive production and had little interest in stabilising its workforce. Thus where manufacturing had increased wages by 10.8 per cent between 1954 and 1962, mining increased theirs only by 5 per cent, and agriculture only 3 per cent. Mining was therefore not as enthusiastic as manufacturing in encouraging a permanent work force by means of higher wages, but also not quite as resistant as agriculture in maintaining the old order.[22]

This move to stabilise workers was reflected in state policy, especially during the Federation period, a period marked by reform in reaction to the wave of independence movements throughout the colonised world. These reforms were articulated around 'partnership' with the African population, producing measures to encourage the emergence of a permanent urban proletariat, a full-time peasantry along with education reforms.[23] The commitment to stabilisation and 'partnership' was questioned as government continued to exclude African workers from the definition of employees, a change some argued that could have been accomplished easily. Yet the ever-present political clout of white settler farmers and white skilled workers, the principal voting base in the skewed Rhodesian political system, created a countervailing force compelling the state to minimise reforms. The 1959 amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act allowing limited African trade unions were weakened by continued anti-union repression, effectively limiting the right to organise by decertifying a large number of African unions.[24] These were accompanied by the continued repression of African political organisations.[25]

Mining was largely able to avoid most state-led reforms because the strength and importance of the sector resulted in a hands-off or *laissez-faire* attitude on the part of the State. In many instances the state became dependent on undistributed mining company profits as it borrowed important sums to finance large-scale projects such as the Kariba Dam, Rhodesian Railways and others.[26] This was especially true during UDI when mining industry earnings were crucial to the isolated regime because of the decline caused by sanctions in other sectors. The mining companies became adept at getting around sanctions and between 1965 and 1973 minerals contributed almost exclusively to the 60 per cent overall increase in the value of exports and helped plug the gap created by the loss of tobacco markets.[27] In 1980, 90 per cent of minerals were exported, representing 55 per cent of total exports.[28]

Instead, the mining industry benefitted from this close relationship with government. In 1946, a past-president of the Chamber and manager of the Globe and Phoenix, one of the country's largest gold producers, was appointed Minister of Mines.[29] The industry then obtained tax reductions and the removal of several measures benefitting smallworkers,[30] replacing them with incentives and support programmes. The Chamber also saw a widening of its jurisdiction, eventually acquiring the responsibility to market all minerals except gold,[31] control all industry apprenticeship programmes and training[32] and negotiate labour relations with the mineworkers union,[33] giving it the power to regulate its own wages and working conditions.

This capacity enabled the industry to avoid any major transformation of its labour utilisation model and the racial division of labour but the larger scale of investments, a degree of mechanisation and increases in productivity resulted in increased differentiation. This was aggravated by the growing competition over skilled white workers during UDI when they were being conscripted or were emigrating. Increases in productivity resulted in an increase in gross output per employee from 169 ZWD a year in 1938, to 1 002 ZWD in 1958, to 1 990 ZWD in 1968, and to 5 178 ZWD in 1978.[34]

Wage differentials increased as the bulk of wage increases accompanying productivity growth went to European workers who continued to absorb the bulk of mine wages. In 1975 they absorbed 45 per cent of the wage bill, yet represented only 5 per cent of the workforce; their wages were the highest in the country, even compared to European workers in other sectors.[35] European workers increased their wages by 69 per cent from 2 822 ZWD to 7 590 ZWD in the 18 years between 1958 and 1976. African wages remained extremely low in spite of an overall increase of 66 per cent during the same period and in fact between 1968 and 1972, the total African wage bill fell as a percentage of gross output from 19.7 per cent to 14.8 per cent. In 1975, African unskilled workers, who still made up the bulk of the mining workforce, were only making 0.26 ZWD a shift, working 26 shifts a month for a monthly wage of 6.76. ZWD One of the reasons for this low wage was the continued habit of paying a portion of wages in kind. In 1971, rations represented 35 per cent of earnings and in 1975 they added an additional 7.02 ZWD/month to earnings, bringing a workers total yearly revenue to 165.36 ZWD still below the Poverty Datum Line for a single person.[36] The 1975 Agreement raised minimum direct wages for underground workers to 0.40 ZWD per shift, resulting in a monthly wage of 10.40 ZWD for 26 shifts (excluding rations).[37]

Wage differentials also increased between skill categories, reflecting a growing skill differential between unskilled and semi-skilled workers thus further aggravating the wage differences between European and African workers. The disparity increased from 2 in 1961 to 4 in 1974, reaching as high as 12 times between some categories. The emergence of a class of semi-skilled workers and their dramatic increase as a proportion of the workforce was largely responsible for this growing differentiation. Thus between 1961 and 1974 the number of workers classified as semi-skilled increased from 4,356 to 14,072 while the unskilled categories fell from 28,184 to 24,104.[38]

Yet white workers still monopolised skilled jobs. The large scale emigration of the European population and military recruitment after the onset of the War of Independence, seriously reduced the ranks of European skilled miners and in 1972 this prompted the industry to accelerate the number of African apprentices.[39] The Chamber of Mines, responsible for skill training and the apprenticeship programme now put a greater emphasis on training generally. Each of the large mining multinationals set up a training centre[40] and the overall number of apprentices increased by 34 per cent between 1961 and 1975, while the number of African apprentices increased from none to 18 per cent of the programme during the same period with the bulk taken on at the end of the period.[41]

The mining workforce remained largely migrant, in spite of government pressure during both Federation and UDI to incite the industry to use more local labour in response to growing unrest and unemployment. Chamber members resisted and by 1969, half of mining labour continued to be recruited externally and in 1974, a number of mines still had an alien content in excess of 75 per cent.[42]

Stabilisation after independence

Independence in 1980 was greeted with high hopes. The objective of the new ZANU-PF government was to transform society in stages, eventually establishing socialist relations. State control would be gradually expanded to assert collective ownership while developing peoples' skills and managerial ability.[43] Two central planning documents, Growth with Equity (1981) and the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) (1982) set these in motion.

Growth with Equity addressed the inequitable pattern of income distribution and the extensive foreign ownership.[44] The Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP)[45] outlined a development strategy based on increasing state control of the economy by establishing investment guidelines while stimulating private sector investment. Mining's role as a valuable source of foreign exchange, employment and productive capacity was recognised yet the government sought greater control in order to increase the amount of company profits retained in the country and to integrate the industry with national development objectives.

Measures were instituted to encourage production levels as well as greater local processing and manufacturing. Thus producers were cushioned from the most severe impact of mineral price instability, prevalent in the early 1980s, and provided with fiscal incentives as well as financial and technical assistance in the form of additional support to exploration and geological mapping.

Labour policy in the development plan aimed at increasing employment levels by encouraging labour intensive production while overcoming the effects of the colonial racial division of labour by reducing wage, race and skill disparities as well as improving skill levels within the country. In addition, it responded to the mining industry's problem of a shortage of skilled manpower by improving skill levels. This would be done by increasing on-the-job training, upgrading existing skilled personnel, increasing the capacity of mining schools and easing restrictions on ex-patriate personnel in order to temporarily fill the skills gap caused by departing personnel.

The first step in greater government intervention was the establishment of the Minerals Marketing Board in 1982, giving government control over mineral marketing. This was seen as a first priority because of the suspected loss of revenue during the sanctions period. The Chamber was removed as the sole marketing agent for all minerals[46] with the sole exception of gold which continued to be sold through the Reserve Bank and the sale administered by the Chamber's Gold Committee.[47] The next major intervention was the establishment of the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation in 1984, charged with making the state 'predominant in the mining sector' by increasing its participation in all mining enterprises.[48]

Pre-independence support programmes for the industry continued or were expanded in order to maintain industry viability. The Ministry of Mines' budget was doubled in the first four years after independence, allowing it to finance the expansion of its technical capacity in geology, metallurgy, essaying, analysis and to maintain the plant hire scheme.[49] In addition to providing additional services to the industry, it allowed the Ministry to increase its knowledge of the sector, a knowledge that had only been in industry hands.

The highly developed consultative mechanism established during the previous regime continued after independence. The powerful Mining Affairs Board, the principal liaison between government and industry continued many of its pre-independence functions, including the issuance of Exclusive Prospecting Orders. The Chamber maintained its access to the highest policy-making levels as the Ministry consulted extensively with it around the amendments to the Mines and Minerals Act in 1983.[50] The industry was also represented on the Minerals Marketing Board and the new powerful Retrenchment Committee that oversaw all retrenchments in the country.[51]

Government did not increase mining taxation to any great extent nor eliminate the generous pre-independence fiscal incentives, including the Gold Support Price, a subsidy to producers in times of low prices. In the first 2 annual budgets of 1980-1981 and 1981-82, the state attempted to reduce depletion allowances and remove certain tax deductions, but most were reinstated in 1982-83, to await the results of the Tax Commission's examination of the country's entire taxation structure. Indirect taxes did increase however, but this was aimed at all industries, by imposing an excise duty on petrol and fuel as well as taxes on imports, sales taxes and income tax paid by high earners. A training levy was also instituted which we will return to below.

By 1984, falling mineral prices coupled with a drought, resulted in a growing public balance of payment deficit, prompting government to introduce fiscal measures that were unpopular with mining and other outward-oriented companies. These included suspending the outflow of locally generated income, freezing branch and partnership profits (with some exceptions), reducing import allocations by 60 per cent and gaining access to the blocked external securities pool. These measures allowed the government to avert a national financial crisis[52] yet the mining industry argued that they caused a serious shortage in the purchase of parts and equipment.

Government's modification of labour measures resulted in the intervention in areas where the Chamber had previously maintained important jurisdiction. One of the earliest measures was the adoption in December 1981 of the Conditions of Service Regulation aimed at restructuring employment practices. This legislation repealed many colonial employment regulations, including the Masters and Servants Act, the African Juveniles Employment Act, African Labour Regulations Act and the Foreign Migratory Labour Act.

Government also began legislating minimum wages that saw mining wages increases as seen in table 1.

In addition to these raises, the United Mineworkers of Zimbabwe (UMWZ)

Table 1. Mining wage increases after independence[53] (monthly minimum wages, grade 1 employees)

	Nominal ZWD	Real ZWD	Annual change %	Index Real wages (1984=100)
1980	43	-	-	–
1980[1]	58	-	-	-
1981	85	-	84.6	-
1982	105	-	12.8	-
1983	110	-	-18.3	-
1984	126	120.00	-11.1	100
1985	143.75	133.60	11.3	111.3
1986	158.81	127.80	- 4.3	106.5
1987	-	111.90	-12.5	93.2
1988	181.88	120.30	7.6	100.3
1989	210.08	123.50	2.6	102.9
1990	247.78	124.20	0.5	103.5
1991	301.48	120.70	- 2.8	100.6

Note: 1. After wage increase of 31/12/80 successfully appealed to government to remove the industry's right to pay lower wages by deducting food and accommodation costs, which allowed them to pay 48 ZWD a month less than other sectors in 1981, until this was brought to an end in 1982. Government addressed the issues of wage disparities by raising the wages of those workers who were below the Poverty Datum Line and by excluding high wage earners from early wage increases. Restrictions were also imposed on overtime work as a way of increasing employment[54] but after lobbying government, claiming a shortage of skills, mining was made exempt.[55]

The expanded Ministry of Labour established a Retrenchment Committee to oversee retrenchments, requiring that industry now justify them. This was opposed by all industrial sectors, but the mining industry, with a seat on the Committee, gained important concessions, winning the right to dismiss workers on disciplinary grounds.[56] The industry downturn resulted in retrenchments nonetheless especially in nickel, asbestos, copper and even gold, yet industry stated that these regulations made retrenchments and mine closures more expensive and more difficult as they required extensive negotiations prior to closing.[57]

The Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development was established soon after independence to enhance training and skill development and to take over all private and public training, including mining industry training previously managed by the Chamber. The objective was to become self-sufficient in skills, resulting in restrictions on the employment of foreign artisans, and to move away from the previous emphasis on training a narrow base of specialists, replacing this with a broader access to technical training and apprenticeships.[58]

There was also a realisation that the prevalence of an entrenched job colour bar during colonialism required a more comprehensive approach to correct wage and skill disparities as it was suspected that the racial division of labour resulted in the inadequate recognition of the skills of many workers, especially semi-skilled workers.[59] An extensive National Manpower Survey was undertaken in 1981 to obtain a better picture of skills available in the workforce.[60] The Survey confirmed the economy's reliance on the semi-skilled workers:

"(who are) often ignored or even despised and have been the backbone of the colonial capitalist economy such as that we in Zimbabwe inherited at independence. It was and is these workers who have rendered viable and profitable various operations including mining, agriculture, secondary industry and the services."[61]

While confirming the coincidence of skill structure with race, the survey found a wide-range of other disparities. In mining, it found, not surprisingly, few women working in the sector, as well as a large percentage of workers with low levels of education and an unequal distribution of earnings between skill, race and gender. Mining was second only to agriculture in skill disparity.

As a result, measures to upgrade unrecognised skills in all sectors were introduced. This included skills testing aimed at upgrading those performing semi-skilled or skilled tasks without adequate recognition or salary. By the end of 1982, 1 637 had been upgraded and by the end of 1983, approximately 6 000 workers had been trade tested.[62]

Additional training opportunities were provided. Apprenticeship training programs were extended, with the objective of doubling the number of completed apprenticeships during the term of the TNDP, from 5 454 in 1982 to 11 198 in 1984, increasing their availability in all fields. This would be achieved by establishing 6 new technical colleges in different regions of the country and encouraging in-house training. Many of these have not been built because of financial limitations.[63] Greater access to mining skills were provided by opening departments of mining engineering and extractive metallurgy at the University of Zimbabwe.[64] More recently, the former Bulawayo School of Mines, now the Zimbabwe School of Mines, was reopened with industry and government support to train technicians.

Against industry wishes, government took control of the apprenticeship programmes by creating a single advisory board for manpower training and development. This would create a pool of prospective apprentices from which industry would draw. A new training levy was imposed on industry to finance the new training scheme and provide grants and rebates to employers and institutions to finance government approved in-house training. This was to be funded through the training levy but was expanded in 1983 as the Ministry increased the rates from 0.1 per cent of the total wage bill to 1.0 per cent, with an expected return of 10 MZWD annually to the programme.[65]

Chamber powers were further limited by a new apprenticeship classification system. The categories of 'journeymen' and 'semi-skilled' were streamlined and replaced with four skill classifications. In addition, a worker could now obtain an apprenticeship classification based on an assessment of equivalent skills gained through experience, giving him access to skilled or semi-skilled jobs without formal training. The Chamber opposed this scheme, arguing that it would lose control over the type of training and access to employees, and that the absence of adequate criteria prevented the proper equation of training with experience. It was also opposed to the constraints on emigration which the government imposed on trained apprentices, as in 1982, all apprentices were bonded to the government rather than employers. According to the Chamber, their requests were 'singularly unsuccessful'.[66]

A new Labour Bill was adopted in 1985, rendering the rest of colonial labour legislation obsolete: the Industrial Conciliation Act, Minimum Wages and Employment Acts; extending the full labour relations system to African workers.

This was one of the government's most controversial pieces of legislation as both unions and management were opposed to the sweeping new powers held by the Ministry of Labour, including its right to overrule negotiated settlements. The Ministry could now set hours of work, wages, leave and other conditions of employment. The right to strike was essentially revoked as most industries could be declared essential services. Employers had to provide full financial disclosure in the case of a lock-out, also outlawed in practice. Labour tribunals were given more weight as workers could now accuse an employer of unfair labour practices, go before a labour tribunal with the power to compel the employer to reinstate the worker, pay legal fees and back pay.[67]

Not surprisingly, the Chamber resented these new powers and while government claimed that these would strengthen the hand of the fledgling unions, the unions saw them as greater intervention in the collective bargaining process. Bargaining in mining had been highly structured before independence as the National Employment Council for Mining, representing all mines with more than 40 workers, brought together the Chamber and the union in yearly negotiations. Yet the collective bargaining process was relatively weak as it established only minimum wages for each job category, leaving companies to pay higher wages voluntarily, thus leaving the bulk of the all important wage issues outside the collective bargaining process. After independence, negotiations were still undertaken through the employment council, yet the establishment of minimum wages by the Minister of Labour, left few wage issues within the bargaining process.

In practice

Most of these measures, while changing relations with the industry, did not successfully improve the government's capacity to dictate economic and social policy to this powerful, externally-oriented industry and thus integrate it significantly into a domestically-oriented development strategy. Government attempts were impeded by the industry's capacity to argue for exemptions to several regulations and to lobby successfully against any major reorganisation of the industry. This was a result, on the one hand, of industry size, concentration, outward orientation and cohesion and, on the other, of government's need to maintain employment and export levels at a time of low international mineral prices. These low prices resulted in serious economic problems for several companies, at a time when the government was putting its new planning mechanism into place. Many of these problems persisted during the decade, with low levels of investment and exploration spending. Government began shifting policy orientation away from control, increasingly replacing it with support mechanisms to maintain production and employment levels.

In 1980 and 1981 gold prices were relatively good but falling prices for all minerals after 1981 led to falling profits and cash flow problems with the industry threatening the closure of many mines, especially in base metals. Already in 1981, the value of minerals produced fell for the first time in 15 years.[68] Several companies incurred important losses and assumed heavy debts.[69] The industry blamed their poor profit on legislated wage increases,[70] higher electricity costs (both linked to state policy)[71] and the overvaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, arguing that the state should provide operating grants to offset increased costs. The state did devalue the currency by 48 per cent between 1980 and 1984[72] and instead of operating grants, it established the Special Assistance Scheme to provide government loans or loan guarantees to large mining companies in order to maintain employment. In 1982/83, these were valued at 41.7 MZWD. Loans had simple interest at a maximum rate of 13 per cent, repayable over 5 years and were guaranteed through share holdings which the government could convert to equity at par pending full repayment. The base mineral sectors of the biggest companies benefitted - Rio Tinto, Lonrho, Messina, and Anglo American which through its affiliates Bindura Nickel and ZimAlloys obtained loans of 12 MZWD.[73] A further15 MZWD in loans was also made available to the industry,[74] and in 1984 another 18 MZWD was made available to cushion mines from rising electricity costs, the only sector that benefitted from this support.[75] The Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) purchased a few ailing mines[76] and became active in several minerals. It also played an important role in Hwange Colliery, as the sector was considered strategic given the objective of energy self-sufficiency.[77]

This downturn in the early part of the decade coincided with an international downturn in investment patterns[78] but by the end of the decade this was no longer the case though mineral prices remained weak in real terms.[79] The only major investment throughout the decade was the new Renco gold mine opened in 1980 in which Rio Tinto invested 25 MZWD with only 7 MZWD raised outside the country. This lack of investment occurred in exploration as well, resulting in a decline in the country's reserves during the 1980s. This decline would force additional reliance on gold reef mining, but its smaller scale is not sufficient to attract large scale investment. For that it needs the security of a big ore reserve and this requires exploration.[80]

The two principal mechanisms established to assert government intervention in the sector were also proving to be problematic. The ZMDC owned and operated only marginal mines, bought to prevent closures rather than because of their economical viability. The sole exception was the large scale investment in Hwange Colliery whose output increased from approximately 3.5 to 5 MT per year. The Minerals Marketing Board also came under fire with some alleging that it was ineffective, selling Zimbabwe's minerals at low prices because it continued to use the same European merchants previously involved in sanctions busting. These are considered minor players in the field and it is estimated that newer more profitable marketing outlets could be found.[81]

By the end of the decade, the effects of years of low mineral prices, a lack of new investment and the disruptions caused by destabilisation in the region resulted in a drop in Zimbabwe's mineral production in spite of the efforts to maintain both production and employment levels. In U.S. dollar terms, the value of production fell by 13 per cent between 1980-1990, from 660 MUSD to 574 MUSD.[82] This was matched by a drop in total mine employment by 17.8 per cent between 1981 and 1984, losing another 14 per cent by 1992.[83]

In response, the government began providing additional incentives to the industry by the end of the decade, a policy that is now being encouraged by structural adjustment. It responded to industry requests for additional foreign currency[84], eventually allowing them a special import retention scheme of 5 per cent of earnings in the early 1990s. The Chamber also received concessions regarding the issuing of temporary residence permits, easing the hiring of expatriate specialists.[85] Generous investment promotion replaced investment guidelines, even encouraging 100 per cent ownership by foreigners in mining and other sectors.[86] The adoption of structural adjustment at the end of the decade included the removal of many government controls such as the Retrenchment Committee resulting in labour shedding and rising unemployment. Government is also withdrawing from the collective bargaining process and allowing the 1993 mining negotiations to go ahead without Ministerial involvement. At the same time, mining companies have benefitted from further Zimbabwe dollar devaluation since the adoption of structural adjustment making their products more competitive on the world market while reducing their labour costs in relation to the value of their product as workers continue to be paid in Zimbabwe dollars while company earnings are pegged to foreign currency. Thus we will see below that Zimbabwean miners are being paid increasingly less in comparison to their foreign counterparts.

Current labour utilisation

This failure to alter the industry's structures and integrate it more closely with the national economy has limited government's ability to compel industry into further reform of its labour structures, resulting in the persistence, in the early 1990s, of several components of the cheap migrant labour system. This was clearly illustrated by the results of an industry survey undertaken with the Institute of Mining Research at the University of Zimbabwe in 1993. The survey focused on skills and training and collected a broad array of data on production, levels of mechanisation, job categories and titles, wages, bonus, nationality, diplomas and certificates, current training activities and needs.[87] The rate of response was good, including 44 per cent of total mining employment and 50 per cent of shift paid workers in the industry at the time of the survey in August 1993.

Wages continue to be low in mining. As early as 1983, wage increases started falling behind inflation, as we saw in Table 1, caused in part by the rapid devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar. With the introduction of structural adjustment, devaluation accelerated significantly so that upon entering wage negotiations in 1993 the inflation rate for that year alone was 43 per cent while wage increases awarded for 1993-1994 were only 12.5 per cent for all mines, with the exception of the nickel and asbestos mines who only got a 10 per cent increase.[88] Nominally wages have increased since independence - a minimum wage for the least skilled was 364.26 ZWD (January-June, 1993) for 26 shifts a month at 14.01 ZWD per shift. Yet when deflated by 43

Table 2. Negotiated minimum wage (without increments)

Grades	All mines January June 1993 ZWD	All Mines July 93– June 94 ZWD	Asbestos & Nickel[91] July 93– June 94 ZWD
1	14.01	15.76	15.41
2	14.31	16.10	15.74
3	14.50	16.31	15.95
4	15.09	16.98	16.60
5	16.09	18.10	17.70
6	17.67	19.88	19.44
7	19.14	21.53	21.05
8	22.38	25.18	24.62
9	30.72	34.56	33.79
10	36.58	41.15	40.24
11	45.85	51.58	50.44
12	51.36	57.78	56.50
13	56.10	63.11	61.71

per cent, it falls to 207.63 ZWD a month. For the sake of comparison, when this is converted into U.S. dollars (valued at USD = 6.45 ZWD in March 1993), it represents only 32.19 USD for a month of 26 shifts and 48-hour weeks.

In an attempt to have wages catch up with the cost of living during the 1993 negotiations, the union illustrated workers' loss of purchasing power by showing the real cost of a monthly basket of basic goods, evaluated at 680.07 ZWD.[89] As can be seen from Table 2, even with the wage increases won for 1993-94, the minimum wage for grade 1 increased to 15.76 ZWD/shift, so that only skilled workers, classified in category 9 and above, earn enough to purchase this basic minimum.[90] According to our survey, only 9.8 per cent of unionised workers are categorised grade 9 and above.

Table 3. Average actual wages, 1993

Grades	Per shift/per month[1] (No increments) ZWD	Per shift/per month (With increments & allowances) ZWD
1	15.05 / 391.30	16.28 / 423.28
2	16.03 / 416.78	17.37 / 451.62
3	17.04 / 443.04	18.69 / 485.94
4	18.33 / 476.58	19.50 / 507.00
5	19.36 / 503.36	21.22 / 551.72
6	22.65 / 588.90	24.51 / 637.26
7	25.17 / 654.42	27.22 / 707.72
8	38.05 / 989.30	41.91 / 1089.66
9	42.20 / 1097.20	46.83 / 1217.58
10	49.43 / 1285.18	53.90 / 1401.40
11	74.05 / 1925.30	88.69 / 2305.94
12	102.86 / 2674.36	120.27 / 3127.02
13	106.44 / 2767.44	121.21 / 3151.46

Note: 1. Monthly wages are calculated by multiplying earnings per shift by 26, the minimum monthly work load stipulated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Table 3 shows average actual wages (as opposed to negotiated minimum wages) and average actual wages plus increments and allowances and even though these are higher than the negotiated minimum wages, we found them to be low. For the lowest skill grade, actual wages (including increments and allowances) were 16.28 ZWD per shift, and at the highest skill grade,121.21 ZWD. Yet even with these higher wage rates, that include wages accorded by the mines over and above the minimum wage, as well as allowances and increments for things such as years of service, night work, working underground and others, workers have to be classified at least at grade 7 to be able to afford the minimum basket of goods described by the union. Only 16.8 per cent of unionised workers are classified 7 or above, and inflation continues to erode their gains.

Table 4 indicates the large wage disparities between skill levels and the extent to which these disparities increase as the grade levels increase. The difference between actual and minimum wages increase as do the discrepancies in the size of the wage differential between grades. Both increase as the grade level increases.

We noted that companies are more likely to pay only minimum wages to the least skilled categories, in grades 1 and 2 where there is only a small differential of 12.3 per cent between minimum and actual wages, while workers in higher grades have a difference of 64.8 per cent. At the same time, wage increases are larger as workers move up the hierarchy of grades: wage increases between grades among unskilled categories are only 6.38 per cent, yet rise to 24 per cent among the skilled categories. The differential in actual wages (without increments) between grades 1 and 13 was found to be 7.04 times, and with increments, it was 7.44. Yet the differential in

Table 4. Average wage differentials, broken down by skill level

	Difference bet. minimum and and actual wages (no increments)	Average increase between grades
Unskilled (1-3)	12.3 per cent	6.38 per cent
Semi-skilled (4-8)	34.7 per cent	8.42 per cent
Skilled (9-13)	64.8 per cent	24.08 per cent

minimum wages between the highest and lowest is only 4 times.

The discrepancy between skill groups is therefore still high and continues the trend found in the post World War II period. Government policy aimed at reducing these disparities by raising the salary of the lowest paid has contributed to reducing the disparity in minimum wages between different grades to 4. In 1974, the disparity in actual wages had been 12, and this has fallen to 7.44 in 1993, a significant improvement. Yet the current practice of negotiated wage rates giving each skill category the same across-the-board percentage increase, coupled with management practice of paying a greater differential between nominal and actual wages to the higher graded workers, will not reduce this disparity.

Skills: As part of manpower development, government tracked changes in skill levels in all industrial sectors, including mining, until approximately 1986. Our 1993 survey confirmed the early trend they reported, that the percentage of unskilled workers declined, semi-skilled workers increased and, after an initial decline, the number of skilled workers increased, while the number of managers remained constant.

This continues the trend that began prior to independence with the diversification of the workforce and the growing importance of semi-skilled workers. The growth of the skilled category also represents an important trend indicating a more skilled workforce, yet the workforce continues at least nominally to have a low level of skills as the unskilled and semi-skilled continue to make up 88.2 per cent of the workforce. In fact in 1993, Table 6 shows that the single most numerous group continues to be the most unskilled: the grade 1 lashers and general labourers make up 24 per cent of the workforce, and the grade 4 drillers and operators (the lowest category among the semi-skilled) are a further 19 per cent. These workers use simple forms of technology -lashing and hand held drills, indicating an overall low level of skills for at least 64 per cent of the workforce (grades 1-4 combined) as well as a low level of mechanisation.

In fact, the growth among skilled workers throughout the post-independence period could possibly represent little more than a slow replacement of the white skilled workers who left at independence. The pattern is not yet clear as industry is also arguing that they require more skilled workers and more training as the work is changing. They are looking for workers with greater flexibility as they seek to introduce multiskilling.[93]

Table 5. Skill distribution between 1981-1993[92] (Percentage of total employees surveyed)

	1981 per cent	1984 per cent	1986 per cent	1991 per cent	1993 per cent
Unskilled Category 1-3	59	58	49	44.4	44.0
Semi-skilled Category 4-8	26	34	38	45.6	44.2
Skilled Category 9-13	12	6	8	7.9	9.58
Professional/ Managerial	3	2	2	2	2

Table 6. Skill breakdown per category, 1993.

Grades	Total number of workers per grade paid	Percentage of total shift workers surveyed
1	5 033	24.6
2	1 637	8
3	2 529	12.3
4	3 905	19
5	2 501	12.2
6	1 289	6.3
7	1 365	6.67
8	190	0.9
9	669	3.3
10	112	0.54
11	432	2.11
12	663	3.25
13	125	0.6
Total	20 450	99.77

The skill distribution presented in Tables 5 and 6 represents the distribution for the industry as a whole. Yet when a breakdown is made according to the size of the mine, the current skill distribution in the small mines resembles the pattern found in 1981 included in Table 5. A generally lower level of skills is found in the numerous small mines as unskilled and semi-skilled workers continue to make up 92.3 per cent of the workforce, with only 2.5 per cent skilled, but with management representing 5 per cent. This contrasts sharply with the largest mines in the study where unskilled and semi-skilled still make up 86.2 per cent, but skilled are 12.1 per cent and management only 1.55 per cent.

Education and training: Many of the training initiatives undertaken since independence had little impact on the numerous mining jobs of mucking, drilling and blasting, though they did reduce the racial division of labour to an extent especially among designated trades. Reforms described above were reserved for designated trades and the number of tradesmen now classified in Classes 1-4, currently represent 13.38 per cent of the workforce, the most numerous certificates present in the mines at the time of the survey.

In general, there were few people with mining certificates in the mines surveyed. The most numerous certificates present were the 2 types of blasting licences that together make up 9.60 per cent of the workforce and were found to be present in all but one mine. The other certificates: the overseer and senior overseer miner, plant operators, mine surveyors, government mining diploma, mine manager's certificate were only present among 0.06 to 0.57 per cent of the workforce and absent from 27 to 58 per cent of the mines. This was peculiar as the mine manager's certificate is required for all mine managers and it was found to be absent in 41.3 per cent of mines.

Certificates are required as low as grade 5 (the mine blasting licence) and especially beyond grade 11 (requiring the Certificate of Registration as overseer miner). Certificates are obtained by government testing through the Ministry of Mines who register and test trainees, yet few workers register directly, without the support or sponsorship of their employers.[94] This is also the case for students wishing to register for the Zimbabwe School of Mines for mining technician's degrees. Students wishing to enter designated trades can do so independently at the polytechnics, as can students seeking university-level degrees.

The low level of certificates present is not unusual in mining as most skills are traditionally acquired through experience. Among the workers surveyed, 39 per cent of those surveyed have 10 years of experience or more and only 21.6 per cent have less than 2 years experience. Combined with the low level of formal certification, this would indicate a higher level of skills than their grade levels indicate, leading to the conclusion that there is a bottleneck in skill recognition among shift workers, graded 1 to 13. Until an independent assessment is made of the actual level of skills used in different jobs, we refer to 'nominal' skill levels rather than absolute skill levels. We therefore categorise the Zimbabwe mining industry as nominally unskilled when in fact a higher level of skills might be present.

Migrancy: The formal migrant labour system has clearly been abandoned. In fact, all remaining foreign 'migrant' workers were accorded National Registration Certificates, a form of dual nationality, at a mass citizenship ceremony in 1984. This acknowledged the large number of foreign workers, especially from Malawi, working in Zimbabwe for many years.

This dual status made it difficult to quantify 'foreign' workers in the survey. Most companies said they had no 'foreign' workers, though 9 out of the 29 did acknowledge their presence and among those, we again find discrepancies according to skill levels.

Among the companies indicating having 'foreign' workers, there were only 11 'foreign' workers in management levels; the largest group of 'foreign' workers were in unskilled categories, going as high as 50.4 per cent of unskilled workers in one case, 43.6 per cent in the semi-skilled and 11.8 per cent in the skilled. The average number of 'foreign' workers was 33.8 per cent of the unskilled workforce, 26.64 per cent of semi-skilled, and only 5.77 per cent of the skilled. These high levels, in spite of the small sample indicate that there is still a high percentage of 'foreign' workers in the country and their over-representation in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories is indicative of their marginalisation within the industry. Further research would be of interest to determine the causes of this marginalisation. We will see below however that they are also disadvantaged given the new form of migrancy which now exists in mining.

Foreign migrancy has now been replaced by domestic migrancy. Zimbabweans now make up the bulk of the workforce but migrate between mines and communal areas, retaining many of the problems of previous transnational migration. Potts and Mutambirwa describe this as a permanent form of working-life migrancy while Zinyama describes it as circulatory migrancy. Potts and Mutambirwa describe the strategies used by families to make use of the economic opportunities available to them: they found immediate families essentially united with women returning to communal areas at times during the year to tend to family land, in the attempt not only to supplement miners' wage income but to maximise their land and their rights to it. Men occasionally visit the communal areas, doing so on public holidays or at peak times in the agricultural cycle. In the case of mining, several anecdotal comments confirm a similar pattern. Mining companies occasionally ease the situation by making small plots of land available near the mine sites to allow families to supplement their income. The remaining 'foreign' workers are disadvantaged by this system as they have little access to this form of migration given the greater distances involved.

Miners, like agricultural and domestic workers, retain their dependency on the communal areas because they are compelled to return to them once they are inevitably evicted from their mine housing after retrenchment, injury or pension. They must thus assure their access to this land while working in the mines. Once retired, they must build a house and in many cases, this absorbs their entire pension, leaving them nothing for their remaining years, requiring that they have the physical capacity to work that land, a situation that is far from guaranteed given the physical hardships associated with mining. This situation has been aggravated by low mining pensions, especially as workers who are currently retiring are receiving benefits from older inadequate programmes, and inflation is eating into their small retirement packages.

This makes access to permanent housing at or near the mine crucial and it has been a highly contentious issue since well before independence. Since 1982, when the government removed housing subsidies from minimum wages, negotiations over the price of mine housing has been in dispute. Mining companies have pledged to improve the quality of housing with some investment occurring since independence, but according to the union, the quality of housing is so poor that no rental or even utilities should be charged. In 1983, one-third of all mine employees still lived in single accommodations.[95] Rental in 1990 was between 16.25 ZWD and 26.25 ZWD a month, depending on the size and quality of the accommodation.[96] There is currently an attempt to reach a permanent solution and the union has been mandated to come up with a proposal.

Conclusion

Thus the failure to significantly transform the role and structures of the mining industry in Zimbabwean society has weakened further attempts to change its labour utilisation model, resulting in the persistence of several elements of the migrant labour system, albeit somewhat reformed. The adoption of structural adjustment and the renewed importance of the private sector as the vehicle for growth and development offer little hope of significant change. This prompts us to isolate several aspects of the Zimbabwean experience and offer them as policy recommendations for the New South Africa.

These recommendations can be grouped into 3 levels. The first refers to narrow policy areas. We have seen that while it is important to solve the persistant problem of foreign labour in South Africa given the large number of workers that still migrate from Mozambique and Lesotho,[97] ending migrancy as an element of the structure of mining employment requires more than legislating an end to foreign labour. Instead reforms must be implemented addressing each of the components of the cheap migrant system. These range from developing means by which workers can gain access to permanent housing during their working life, developing community life at the mine site and improving wages and pensions, all of which are necessary for miners to bring their families to the mine site. It is important however to develop policies in these areas in collaboration with those involved, especially the workers themselves as we have seen that ending migrancy is not a priority for all workers. There are also important differences between the South African and the Zimbabwean case as there are differences in their subsistence agriculture.

At the same time, training programs should be made available, allowing miners to acquire skills and to do so independently of employers. This would include a government-run training and testing centre which would evaluate skills acquired through experience.

A second level of policy recommendations is more fundamental, as they address the structures of the industry. The industry should be encouraged to move away from its current form of labour intensity based on low productivity and skill levels. Instead, labour productivity should be encouraged that does not depend on the introduction of costly imported technology, but on improving workers skills while making the protection of existing jobs a priority, as much as possible.

A third level is political, having to deal with the power relations between a state committed to social change while protecting employment levels and an outwardly-oriented mining industry compelled to maintaining a healthy bottom line in the relatively short term and doing so within an increasingly competitive world market. State dependence on maintaining employment levels must not prevent it from tackling some of the more fundamental issues of mining's role in the country's future economic development and challenging it to seek ways of transforming its labour practices. It should especially incite industry to achieve this within a framework that also encourages greater productivity while improving skills and maintaining employment levels. This would allow improvements in many of the components of the migrant labour system while assuring ongoing industry viability.

Notes

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2 Chamber of Mines of South Africa, *Annual Report, 1993-4*, 1994, p. 28.

3 NUM Congress Resolution (1991) reproduced in NALEDI, *Migration to South Africa*, Johannesburg, NALEDI Discussion Document, 1994, p. 28.

4 D. Potts and C. Mutambirwa, Rural-Urban Linkages in Contemporary Harare: Why Migrants Need their Land, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 16, 4, December 1990, pp. 677-698. L.M. Zinyama, Rural Household Structure, Absenteeism and Agricultural Labour: A Case Study of Two Subsistence Farming Areas in Zimbabwe, *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 7, 2, (1986), pp. 163-173.

5 Introduction, *Studies in the History of African Mine Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe*, I.R. Phimister and C. Van Onselen, (eds), Gweru, Mambo Press, 1978, p. viii.

6 C. Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 11.

[7] C. Van Onselen, *Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-33*, London, Pluto Press, 1980, p. 25-26.

[8] R. Bush & L. Cliffe, Labour Migration and Agrarian Strategy in the Transition to Socialism in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe as a Case Study, *Review of African Political Economy*, 29, pp.77-94, p.78.

[9] David Johnson, Settler Farmers and Coerced African Labour in Southern Rhodesia, *Journal of African History*, 33, 1992, pp.111-128, and D.G. Clarke, African Mine Labourers and Conditions of Labour in the Mining Industry in Rhodesia, 1940-74, *Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, 9, 4, December 1975, pp. 177-218.

[10] M. Bratton,Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe: Comparative Notes from the Neo-Colonisation in Kenya, Journal of Modern African Studies, 15, 4, 1977, 591-611, p.601-603.

[11] Clarke, op.cit., p. 178.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Government of Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, March 1983.

[14] I. R. Phimister, Zimbabwe: the Path of Capitalist Development, *History of Central Africa*, David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin (eds), London: Longman, 1983, pp. 251-290.

[15] Paul Jourdan, *The Minerals Industry of Zimbabwe*, Harare, Open Report Number 107, Institute of Mining Research, University of Zimbabwe, 1990, p. 4-5.

[16] G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*, G. Arrighi and J. Saul (eds), New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973, pp. 336-377, p. 354. Currently, multinationals present are Anglo American Corp., Cluff Resources, Falconbridge, Falcon Gold, Forbes & Thompson, Lonrho, Rio Tinto, Union Carbide.

[17] Interview, Leo Kimble, then President of the Chamber of Mines and General Manager of Union Carbide, Harare, August 9, 1984.

[18] J.Barber, *Rhodesia: Road to Rebellion*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 76.

[19] Colin Leys, op.cit., p.107. Colin Stoneman, Foreign Capital and the Reconstruction of Zimbabwe, *Review of African Political Economy*, 11, January-April,1978, p. 69.

[20] G. Arrighi, Political Economy of Rhodesia, op.cit., p. 354-355.

[21] G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: a Study of the Proletarianisation of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*, G. Arrighi & J. Saul (eds) New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973, pp.180-234, p. 228.

[22] G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies in Historical Perspectives, op.cit., p. 217.

[23] There is an extensive literature on these reforms: James Barber, op.cit. R. Bush and L. Cliffe, op.cit. R. Riddell, *Education for Employment*, London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, Series: From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, 1980.

[24] John Sprack, *Rhodesia, South Africa's Sixth Province*, London, International Defence and Aid Fund, 1974, p. 19-22.

[25] C.J.M. Zvobgo, Southern Rhodesia under Edgar Whitehead: 1958-1962, *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, 2, 4, October 1977, pp. 481-492, p. 487.

[26] Anglo American and various of its affiliates loaned the state £25 million (50 MZWD) for the Kariba hydro-electric project, and another £8.5 million (17 MZWD) for the Rhodesian Railways. These projects while publicly funded served the industry needs for cheap electricity and transport. They were important consumers of both these infrastructural commodities. Phimister,1983, op.cit., p.281-282.
For a complete discussion of this relationship through the different periods please see S. Dansereau, *State Power and Economic Transformation: The Transition to Socialism in Zimbabwe*, M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1986, 205 pages.

[27] Bratton, op.cit., p. 606.

[28] Economic Intelligence Unit, *Zimbabwe's First Five Years: Economic Prospects Following Independence*, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. 111, 1981, p. 38-39.

[29] K.A. Viewing, Mining and the Development of Zimbabwe, *Chamber of Mines Journal*, 26, 1, January 1984, pp. 21-51, p. 29.

[30] I.R. Phimister, 1983, op.cit., pp. 281-282.

[31] The Chamber of Mines nonetheless played an important role in gold marketing through its Gold Sales Committee, collecting gold from producers and then channelling it to the Reserve Bank. Interview Leo Kimble, then President of the Chamber of Mines and General Manager of Union Carbide, Harare, August 9, 1984.

[32] Chamber of Mines, *Annual Report for 1982*, 1983, p. 6.

[33] Chamber of Mines, *Annual Report for 1979*, Salisbury, April 1980s, p 4.

[34] Economist Intelligence Unit, 1981, op.cit.

[35] G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies in Historical Perspectives, op.cit., p. 228. A debate exists between Arrighi and Clarke around this issue. Arrighi argues that this greater differentiation and the emergence of the semi-skilled worker is a result of the state's attempt to weaken the white worker's monopoly of skills and its bargaining position. Clarke argues that the white workers' interest in keeping African wages down resulted in important benefits to the industry. White workers did this through their union activity and political activity within the Rhodesian Front Party. Clarke, 1975, op.cit., p. 179.

[36] A term resulting from a study of real incomes in Rhodesia. See R.Riddell and P.S.Harris, *Poverty Datum Line as a Wage Fixing Standard, An Application to Rhodesia*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1975. In addition, the usual calculation is that one miner's wage provides for a family of 7, not a single person.

[37] Clarke, 1975, p. 190.

[38] Clarke. op.cit., 184, 189 & 209.

[39] I. Mandaza, Capital, Labour and Skills in the Context of the Political Economy of Zimbabwe, *Contemporary Marxism*, 7, 1983, 116-139.

[40] *Chamber of Mines Journal*, Vol. 23, November 1981.

[41] Colin Stoneman, *Skilled Labour and Future Needs*, Gweru, Mambo Press, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe Series, 1978.

[42] Clarke, 1975, op.cit., p. 192.

[43] Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, 'Interview', *Social Change and Development*, 1, 6, 1983, p. 2-4, 25.

[44] Government of Zimbabwe, *Growth with Equity: and Economic Policy Statement*, February 1981, 19 pp., p. 1 and 7.

[45] Government of Zimbabwe, *Transitional National Development Plan: 1982/3 - 1984/5*, Harare, Government Printer, Vol. I: November 1982, Vol. II: May, 1983.

[46] Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Mines, *Annual Report for 1982*, p. 1

[47] Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Mines, *Report of the Secretary of Mines for 1981*, Harare, Government Printer, 1982. Interview with Leo Kimble, op.cit.
This continues to give the Chamber a great deal of financial clout merely by controlling and handling these large scale financial transactions.

[48] Established and new developments had to first give priority to government participation in a joint venture operation, but could then proceed independently if the state refused to participate. State participation would ideally be a 51 per cent share, realised through share purchases in exchange for equity. The mandate was to invest, co-ordinate and implement mining development projects for the state; to engage in prospecting, to review economic conditions in the industry and to assist people engaged in mining. It was also responsible for encouraging cooperative mining ventures as an aspect of increasing domestic ownership. *Transitional National Development Plan*, p. 70-71 and Interview with Mike Haddon, Managing Director and E. Kahari, Mining Co-operatives Development Department, Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation, Harare, July 27, 1984.

[49] Government of Zimbabwe, *Estimate of Expenditures for Years ending June 31 1985*, (and 1983), Harare, Government Printer, 1984 (and 1982). K.A. Viewing, Mining and the Development of Zimbabwe, *Chamber of Mines Journal*, 26, 1, January 1984, pp. 21-51, p. 31-33.

[50] Chamber of Mines, *Annual Report for 1983*, Harare, Chamber of Mines, 1984, pp. 8-9.

[51] Chamber of Mines, *Annual Report for 1982*, Harare: Chamber of Mines, 1983. Government of Zimbabwe, *Mining in Zimbabwe, 1982*.

[52] Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, *Annual Economic Review of Zimbabwe*, Salisbury, Government Printer, August 1981, p. 29. Chamber of Mines, *Annual Report for 1980, 1982, 1983*, Harare, 1981, 1983, 1984. Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, *Budget Statement 1984*, Harare, July 26, 1984, pp. 42-44.

[53] Michael Matanga, *Research Study for the Associated Mineworkers of Zimbabwe*, 1991.

[54] *Financial Gazette*, June 14, 1985.

[55] Chamber of Mines, *Annual Report for 1981*, Harare, Chamber of Mines, 1982.

[56] Ibid.

[57] A Rio Tinto spokesman stated that negotiations over the closure of its Empress Nickel Mine in 1982 prolonged operations by an extra year, costing the company 12 MZWD. Interview, Mr. Asbury Mapurutsa, Information Officer, Rio Tinto Zimbabwe Ltd., Harare, August 7, 1984.

[58] *Transitional National Development Plan*, Vol. II, p.30.

[59] Mandaza,op.cit.

[60] Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development, *National Manpower Survey*, Harare: Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development, 3 volumes, 1983.

[61] Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, Foreword to *National Manpower Survey*, 1983, Vol. I, p. i.

[62] Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, *Annual Review of Manpower 1983*, Harare, Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, 1983.

[63] Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development, *On the Three Year Transitional Plan*, Harare, May 1982, p. 7, 20.

[64] *Chamber of Mines Annual Report for 1982*.

[65] *Chamber of Mines Annual Report for 1983*.

[66] Chamber of Mines, *Annual Report for 1982*.

[67] *Moto*, March 1985.

[68] Government of Zimbabwe, *Quarterly Economic Review*, Annual 1983, p. 14.

[69] *Financial Gazette*, April 12, 1990.

[70] Chamber of Mines quoted in *Mining in Zimbabwe 1983*.

[71] *Financial Mail*, March 30th, 1984.

[72] Government of Zimbabwe, *Quarterly Economic and Statistical Review*, No. 1, 1986.

[73] Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Mines, *Report of the Secretary of Mines for 1982*, Harare, Government Printer 1983, p. 4. This was worth between 10-13 MUSD.

[74] *Mining Journal*, April 22, 1983.

[75] Interview Patson Batia, Ministry of Mines, Mineral Promotions and Information Officer, Harare, July 17, 1984.

[76] Those were the mines owned by South Africa's Messina (Transvaal). U.S. Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook, *The Mineral Industry of Zimbabwe*, 1984, p. 937.

[77] This purchase was to increase the state capacity to become self-sufficient in energy given its reliance on oil passing through South Africa and Mozambique and on electricity from Zambia. The state wanted to use its massive coal reserves to fuel the Hwange Power complex. Coal was then classified as a strategic material and the state purchased 40 per cent of the Hwange Colliery for 14 MZWD (15.2 MUSD), reducing Anglo American's share to 20.2 per cent and Union Minière's to 3.3 per cent. Anglo continued to manage the operation under a management contract with the state. Government of Zimbabwe, *Mining in Zimbabwe 1982*, p. 19. This arrangement was being reviewed in 1994 with the State seeking to reduce its involvement.

[78] U.S. Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook, *Minerals in the World Economy, 1984*, Washington, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1985.

[79] Jourdan, op.cit., p. 10.

[80] *Financial Gazette*, April 12, 1990.

[81] These allegations were made in a report to the Ministry that continues to remain confidential. Reported in *Zimbabwe Report*, Economist Intelligence Unit, April 1990.

[82] *Financial Gazette*, June 15, 1990.

[83] Government of Zimbabwe, *Quarterly Digest of Statistics*, March 1984. Employment in 1981 had been 68,200, falling to 56,100 in 1984. In 1992, employment levels had again fallen to 49,300.

[84] Chamber of Mines, *Annual Report for 1989*, Harare, Chamber of Mines, 1990.

[85] *Financial Gazette*, May 18, 1990.

[86] *Chamber of Mines Journal*, June 1989 and *Financial Gazette*, May 12, 1989.

[87] A partial report of the survey has been published in S. Dansereau, *Skills and Training in Zimbabwe's Mining Industry: Preliminary Report of Industry Survey*, Harare, University of Zimbabwe, Institute of Mining Research, Report No. 154, May 1994.

[88] Inflation calculated by First Merchant Bank of Zimbabwe, *Quarterly Guide to the Economy*, March 1993. Wage rates published by the National Employment Council for the Mining Industry, *Wages and Salary Increases: July 1st, 1993*, August 20, 1993.

[89] *Performance and Outlook of Zimbabwe's Mining Sector*, Associated Mineworkers of Zimbabwe, Position Paper 1993 Wage Negotiations, June 1993.

[90] Zimbabwe uses a modified Patterson Grading Scheme, adopted from South Africa in the late 1970s. Unionised grades include categories 1-13, with the lowest being lashers and general labourers, while grade 13 is the shift boss. Management is trying very hard to eliminate some of the most skilled categories from unionised ranks, even paying them on a monthly rather than a shift basis in many cases, and paying them substantially higher wages as we will see below.

[91] The 93/94 wage agreement is the first one allowing a special rate for different sectors. These negotiations were also unusual in that the increase was fixed for the whole year, in the past there had often been further increases awarded for the last six months of the period.

[92] This breakdown has been chosen because it corresponds to the organisation of data collected by the Government's Manpower Survey since 1981, allowing us to compare our findings with their surveys in a longer time series. However, while this is useful in an aggregate sense, a note of caution is necessary as the series includes data compiled by three different studies. Figures for 1981, 1984, 1986 are from Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Manpower Development, *Manpower Surveys*, various years. 1991 figures are from the Chamber of Mines, *Mine Workers Survey*, December 1991. This data was aggregated by the author from the Chamber of Mines Report which gave the number of employees in each job category from 1-13, according to the same breakdown found in the Government *Manpower Surveys*. 1993 data was from our survey.

[93] Interview, Doug Verden, Human Resources Director, Chamber of Mines, March 23, 1993.

[94] Interview, Mr. Mishi, Director, National Employment Council for the Mining Industry, Harare, August 1993.

[95] *Herald*, December 10, 1983.

[96] Government of Zimbabwe, Statutory Instrument 152 of 1990, *Collective Bargaining Agreement: Mining Industry (General Conditions) 1990*, January 25, 1990, p. 1150.

[97] See the comprehensive work of Allan Jeeves, Jonathan Crush, Wilmot James and the members of the large research team presented at the Conference: *Transforming Mine Migrancy in the 1990s*, Cape Town, South Africa, June 27-29, 1994. ■